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INTRODUCTION

Since WikiLeaks began ramping up the magnitude and significance
of its leaks in 2010, the press and the American public have
* Associate, Jones Day; J.D. 2011; B.A. 2007, University of Virginia. Mr. Blanchard would
like to thank Professor Leslie Kendrick for her instrunental guidance and feedback, and his wife for
her keen insight, expert suggestions, and boundless patience. The opinions (and any mistakes) in this
Article are solely Mr. Blanchard's; they are not reflective of, nor should they be ascribed to, Jones Day.
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simultaneously derided the online organization's disclosures as an utter
fiasco,' and heralded them as the ultimate stand on the final frontier of
free speech. 2 Fiasco or freedom's beacon, there is no doubt the
controversy has squarely illuminated the American people's
preoccupation with both the extent of free speech and the importance of
government limitations imposed on dissident or dangerous voices.
Although the recent debate has precipitated the question of whether
governmental suppression of speech may ever be justified by national
security interests, uncertainty over the government's ability to regulate
or punish the inordinately outspoken in any arena has been a
longstanding policy contest. The judicial system, too, has long been
preoccupied with the contentious issue of whether dangerous speech
should be subjected to either prior restraint or subsequent punishment,
or whether any such restriction constitutes dangerous governmental
overreaching. While the Supreme Court has displayed a predilection
toward free expression since the seminal case of New York Times Co. v.
United States (PentagonPapers), declaring that "[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity," the Court nevertheless
declined to impose a categorical ban on all prior restraints.3 While prior
restraints today remain presumptively unconstitutional and are
perceived as a sort of First Amendment bogeyman, the Supreme Court
and most legal scholars acknowledge that, at least in theory, exceptions
to the rule ought to exist.
When the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Pentagon Papers,it
brought to the fore a fundamental tension that pervades American
history: the government's critical interest in maintaining secrecy as a
means of protecting the nation juxtaposed against the twin duties of the
press to inform the public and to hold the government accountable.4
This balance between governmental privacy and public disclosure isas the ten separate opinions written in PentagonPapers demonstrate-a
"disorderly situation" at best.5 Although several decades have passed
1. See, e.g., Pete Hoekstra, WikiLeaks: A Real Man-Made Disaster,POLITICO, Nov. 29,
2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1 110/45683.html.
2. See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, Defend WikiLeaks or Lose Free Speech, SALON, Dec. 6, 2010,
http://www.salon.com/technology/dan-gillmor/2010/12/06/war onspeech.
3. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
4. Compare Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of
the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 273 (1971) ("From our national beginnings, the
Government of the United States has asserted the right to conceal and, therefore, in practical
effect not to let the people know."), with ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 81

(1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT] ("[T]he presumptive duty of the press
is to publish, not to guard security .... ).
5. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 4, at 80. Elaborating, Bickel stated:
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since the Court decided Pentagon Papers, striking the proper balance
between these two competing interests and determining when, and more
importantly, how the press should be prevented from divulging the
government's secrets has bedeviled legal thinkers.
The bulk of scholarship discussing the means by which the
government may prohibit the disclosure of sensitive information by the
press has framed the debate as a choice between two competing
frameworks: prior restraint or subsequent punishment. Under the prior
restraint approach, the government attempts to prevent disclosure
entirely, whereas under the subsequent punishment method, the
government imposes sanctions after the fact of publication. Despite
more than half a century of debate, legal scholars remain divided over
the merits of these approaches as policy rationales and typically elevate
one over the other.
In light of that fact, this Article seeks to dispel the myth that policy
distinctions between prior restraints and subsequent punishments are
significant enough to justify one approach as superior to the other.
Despite the methodological differences between the two frameworks,
the application of either approach produces a similar impact on speech.
For the purposes of this Article, the focus will be on the disclosure of
sensitive governmental information in the context of national security.
The national security context forces the speech debate out of the realm
of the hypothetical, into an ambit where the cost of unlimited speech is
more than a moral or philosophical one.7 It is within this tense context
If we should let the government censor as well as withhold, that would be too
much dangerous power, and too much privacy. If we should allow the
government neither to censor nor to withhold, that would provide for too little
privacy of decision-making and too much power in the press and in Congress.
Id. See also GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR GOVERNMENT KEEPS Us IN THE DARK

22 (2007) (discussing Bickel's delineation of this see-saw effect with regard to governmental
privacy).
6. See infra Part III.A (discussing the minority view that the government has absolutely
no right to limit the press's disclosure of sensitive information).
7. The national security context is appropriate because
[t]he harm that may be expected to flow from revealing a state secret is almost
exclusively related to the first publication. Accordingly, the government's
interest in acting before publication is greater, and the rationale for a rule of
special hostility to this form of regulation is put more sharply in issue.
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412 (1983). Although
Professor Martin Redish is correct that the definition of "national security" is "likely to fluctuate
with the contemporary political climate," it can safely be assumed that there are matters which a
fortiori belong under the national security definitional umbrella (for example, nuclear launch
codes). Martin H. Redish, The ProperRole of the PriorRestraint Doctrine in FirstAmendment
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that both the government and the press have arguably the greatest
interest in their respective responsibilities to the public, and thus, it is
within this context that policy implications carry the most weight.
In addressing the false dichotomy between prior restraints and
subsequent punishments from a regulatory perspective, this Article
proceeds in four Parts. Part I delineates the fundamental tension
discussed in this Article: the difficult balance between the necessity of
keeping sensitive governmental information secret and the right of the
press to disclose certain governmental secrets in order to properly
inform the public. Part II briefly illustrates the aforementioned tension
and demonstrates how it has been addressed by the federal courts in two
principal cases. Thereafter, Part III outlines what have historically been
the three most common approaches to resolving cases that present this
tension: the absolutist position, the prior restraint model, and the
subsequent punishment framework. Part IV analyzes the policy
implications of prior restraints and subsequent punishments in light of
the majority of scholarship which tends to elevate one as superior to the
other. This Article concludes that, despite the many distinctions
purported by scholars to exist between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments, they are, as regulatory tools, practically indistinguishable.
Ultimately, this Article argues that a shift in focus is mandated so as to
generate a more meaningful debate, one that focuses not on approach
but rather on desired outcomes.
I. THE PROBLEM: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION

It is indisputable that in order to safeguard its citizens, the
government must, to a certain extent, keep some information
confidential because it is simply too sensitive or dangerous to expose to
the public.8 For instance, in Near v. Minnesota,9 the Supreme Court
cited in dicta the publication of the sailing dates of troop transports as
an example of the type of information the government would have an
unassailable interest in protecting.' 0 Presumably, therefore, one can
extrapolate from this example the principle that any situation where the
dissemination of information could lead directly to loss of life among
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 86 (1984).
8.

See, e.g., BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 4, at 79 ("The government

is entitled to keep things private and will attain as much privacy as it can get away with
politically by guarding its privacy internally."). More recently, in an editorial calling for the
Obama administration to explain its continued invocation of the state secrets doctrine, the New
York Times declared that "[e]veryone recognizes that there are secrets that must be
protected.. . ." Editorial, Shady Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A38.
9. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
10. Id. at 716.
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the nation's armed forces is compelling enough to admit a ban on such
publication.
Today, publication of the nuclear launch codes, the date and location
of a troop deployment overseas, or a cipher for military encryption
technology all constitute examples of the type of information that the
government plainly has a fundamental interest in keeping private and
thus unpublished. The government has the right to protect such
information because it is potentially dangerous to Americans and
because it is not inherently newsworthy-that is, the public does not
"need to know." It is a critical and well-established American axiom,
however, that the government must not be given a carte blanche to stifle
the publication of any information it deems sensitive or dangerous. In
times of conflict, intolerance of unorthodoxy runs high and the
government is more likely to suppress dissent." During such times, the
government risks suppressing more than necessity demands and as a
result may hopelessly impede the press in the fulfillment of its own
agenda: informing the same people the government endeavors to
protect.
This trend was underscored during the second term of George W.
Bush's presidency. In 2005, the New York Times and the Washington
Post published widely read expos6s on the CIA's secret prison system 2
and the National Security Agency's (NSA's) warrantless wiretapping
program,' 3 respectively. Commenting on the government's investigation
into the disclosure of the wiretapping program, then CIA Director Porter
Goss told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that it was his
"aim and . . . hope that we will witness a grand jury investigation with
reporters present being asked to reveal who is leaking this information. I
believe the safety of this nation and the people of this country deserve
nothing less."' 4 This powerful rhetoric was ratcheted up a few months
11. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985) [hereinafter Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective].
12. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
13. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. It is worth noting that the New York Times sat on this story for an
entire year at the request of the White House, which argued that publishing it might jeopardize
national security. Id. In addition, even when the New York Times did publish this article, it
omitted some pertinent details that the Bush administration asserted would be useful to
terrorists. Id. Risen and Lichtblau won the Pulitzer Prize for their reporting. The 2006 Pulitzer
Prize Winners - National Reporting, http://www.pulitzer.org/biography/2006-National-Report
ing-Groupl. Ironically, Risen has been embroiled in the federal government's controversial
effort to force him to reveal his source for a different story. See infra POSTSCRIPT, at 45.
14. David Johnston, Inquiry into Wiretapping Article Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/politics/1 2inquire.html?pagewnted=all
(quoting Goss).
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later when the New York Times published a piece revealing the details
of the Bush administration's program for monitoring financial records
that it implemented after the September 11 attacks as a counterterrorism
measure. 5 Bill Keller, who at the time served as the newspaper's
executive editor, defended the publication, arguing that despite the
administration's protests the program remained a matter of vital public
interest.16 Less than a week later, however, the House of
Representatives passed a "Sense of the Congress" resolution,
condemning media outlets which, by reporting on the secret program,
"unnecessarily complicated efforts by the United States Government to
prosecute the war on terror and may have placed the lives of Americans
in danger . . . .

During debate over the resolution, Representative

Peter King lambasted the New York Times, claiming it had "woefully
failed in its responsibility" and averring that should another terrorist
attack occur, the "blood will be on their hands."' 8
This sort of invective is indicative of the degree to which the debate
extends and the magnitude of the tension between two of the pillars of
the American psyche-security and speech-that are forced to the
foreground. Professor Vincent Blasi has noted that when, as in times of
war, "the issue is defined as a choice between national self-defense and
the full realization of basic constitutional ideals, few persons would
choose the latter."19 Yet it is in precisely these times that the First
Amendment must do "maximum service" by protecting free speech and
press rights and incidentally the public's interest in being apprised of
governmental policies that might threaten these fundamental
constitutional values. 20 Often, as legal scholar Zechariah Chafee put it,
"[t]he only way to find out whether a war is unjust is to let people say
so,"21 and sometimes-as in Pentagon Papers-this command entails
the publication of information the government claims is too sensitive for
public consumption.
However, the limits of this principle have recently been seriously
tested by the advent of the media insurgent WikiLeaks, "a not-forpublic media organisation" that achieves its goal of disseminating
original source material by providing "an innovative, secure and
15.

Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,

N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.

16.

Id. ("We have listened closely to the administration's arguments for withholding this

information .

. .

. We remain convinced that the administration's extraordinary access to this

vast repository of international financial data, however carefully targeted use of it may be, is a
matter of public interest.").
17. 152 Cong. Rec. H4876 (daily ed. June 29, 2006).
18. Id. at H4881.
19. Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective, supra note 11, at 464.
20. Id. at 449.
21.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1941).
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anonymous way for sources to leak information to [its] journalists and
activists who have sensitive materials to communicate to the public."2 2
On July 25, 2010, WikiLeaks released online a six-year archive
containing nearly 92,000 classified military documents related to
America's prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.23 General James
Jones, President Barack Obama's national security advisor at that time,
quickly condemned the disclosure of the documents for putting the lives
of Americans and Afghans at risk and he castigated WikiLeaks for
failing to contact the White House about the documents.24 In November
and December 2010, WikiLeaks fomented consternation worldwide
when, in multiple installments, it began releasing hundreds of thousands
of diplomatic cables, tens of thousands of which were labeled as secret
or named confidential sources. 25 The White House condemned
WikiLeaks' publication as a "reckless and dangerous action," 26 and
former President Bill Clinton stated his belief that the release would
cost not only jobs but lives as well.2 7
In reporting on WikiLeaks's now infamous series of disclosures, the
New York Times and the other newspapers provided with the documents
agreed not to disclose information likely to put lives at risk or
jeopardize counterterrorism operations.28 However, the government's
fear lies in the fact that WikiLeaks itself is generally inclined to release
most of its documents in their entirety, regardless of the fact that they
may include damaging or even life-threatening details for named
individuals. 29
Plainly, America's recent experience with WikiLeaks brings into
sharp relief the fundamental quandary: When and how does the
government attempt to punish the media for publishing information
22. WIKILEAKS, About, http://www.wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Apr. 30,
2013).
23. C.J. Chivers et al., View is Bleaker than Official Portrayalof War in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at Al.
24. Id.
25. Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S.
Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/
world/29cables.html.
26. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Nov. 28, 2010),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/28/statement-press-secretary.
27. Jennifer Epstein, Bill Clinton: WikiLeaks Will Cost Lives, POLITICO, Dec. 1, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/45791.html.
28. A Note to Readers - Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8. The New York Times "withheld any names of operatives in the
field and informants cited in the reports . .. avoided anything that might compromise American
or allied intelligence-gathering methods such as communications intercepts." Id
29. For example, WikiLeaks has intentionally left the Social Security numbers of soldiers
un-redacted. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets: Julian Assange's Mission for Total
Transparency, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 50.
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similar to that which WikiLeaks has disclosed? Indeed, this question's
salience has been underscored by fallout over Obama administration
leaks that have led to media reports and books on America's use of
drones to execute targeted killings abroad, as well as America's
infiltration of Iran's nuclear facilities via introduction of the Stuxnet
computer virus. 30 Leaders in Congress, incensed over these leaks and
the media's subsequent dissemination of their contents, have stated that
"[e]ach disclosure puts American lives at risk, makes it more difficult to
recruit assets, strains the trust of our partners and threatens imminent
and irreparable damage to our national security." 31
According to Professor Geoffrey Stone, notwithstanding the
attendant risk, discussion about issues of national importance, especially
during wartime, "can help save the nation from tragic blunders."
Under Stone's line of reasoning, if the information would contribute to
the public debate, the publisher ought to be able to disclose it. However,
one must question whether there is ever any information that cannot be
said to constitute a meaningful contribution to the public debate. Put
differently, does Stone's stance, when taken to its logical conclusion,
perhaps over-countenance the actions of WikiLeaks that have been so
widely condemned?
Thus, the difficult and problematic task arises when establishing a
framework that adequately accomplishes the dual aims of protecting
sensitive information and accommodating the disclosure of stories that a
majority of citizens would find inherently newsworthy. Historically,
legal scholars have split over the merits of two approaches: prior
30. See, e.g., Scott Shane, U.S. Attacks, Online andfrom the Air, Fuel Secrecy Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at Al [hereinafter Shane, US. Attacks, Online andfrom the Air]. In
light of these recent disclosures regarding potentially vast expansions of executive authority,
scholar Bruce Ackerman astutely asks whether informing Americans about possible
constitutional violations by their president can ever really be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States. See also Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Protect, Don't Prosecute,PatrioticLeakers,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/dontprosecute-leakers-who-defend-our-constitution.html. According to Ackerman, "[t]o ask the
question is to answer it: The preservation of the Constitution serves as the very foundation of the
'safety or interest' of the nation. Telling Americans about secret presidential actions that
threaten our fundamental law should never be considered violations of the Espionage Act." Id.
Whether Ackerman's point resolves the question or simply serves to reinforce its vexing nature
is a debate that, while compelling, I must leave for another occasion. See infra Part III.C for
more on the relevancy of the Espionage Act.
31. Shane, US. Attacks, Online andfrom the Air, supra note 30, at Al.
32. Geoffrey R. Stone, War Fever, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1131, 1136 (2004) [hereinafter Stone,
War Fever]. More specifically, Stone points out that free speech and publication rights allowed
American citizens to make informed decisions about whether to permit secession by the
southern states, to withdraw from Vietnam, or to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Id.
Today, for example, these same rights can help the United States avoid "tragic blunders" in
executing its mission while troops remain in Afghanistan. Id.
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restraint and subsequent punishment. This schism is important because
the means by which the government elects to regulate speech invariably
implicate constitutional values. To be sure, legal theorist Thomas
Emerson would be as accurate today as he was in 1970 when he
quipped: "[t]he outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is
that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory
of what that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be
applied in concrete cases."33 Emerson's commentary reflects the fact
that there are myriad values that the First Amendment's speech and
press clauses could be taken to embody. Indeed, the First Amendment
can be conceived of alternately as a bulwark against oppression, a
facilitator of the marketplace of ideas, a lubricant for democratic
progress, a conduit for self-expression, an avenue for dissent, or a
combination of some or all of these notions. 34
Whenever the government contemplates the regulation or
suppression of speech, there is an inherent risk that these values could
be diminished. While most commentators, however, are in agreement
that the risks inherent in speech regulation are potentially vast, the
regulatory response to balancing these risks has. been lacking in
coherency. Indeed, scholars have ignored the possibility that they are
answering the wrong question in elevating one methodology over the
other. This Article demonstrates that as regulatory mechanisms for
dealing with this challenge, prior restraint and subsequent punishment
are, contrary to dominant legal thought, essentially equivalent from a
policy perspective. Despite differences in application, both models
invite similar outcomes, and the bulk of this Article addresses the
corresponding shift in analytical focus that such a conclusion
33.

THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970) [hereinafter

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].

34.

For a recapitulation of these and other theories of the First Amendment, see

MATTHEw D. BUNKER,

CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT

THEORY AND THE

CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 1-17 (2001).

35. Within the national security context, the leading First Amendment value that stands in
opposition to the government's right to keep all arguably sensitive information secret is, simply
put, the public's interest in knowing what the government is doing in its name. Historically, the
right of the press to publish has been justified to a significant degree by the public's interest in
being informed about the actions of the government on which it confers power. If, however, this
right is not to be absolute-and it necessarily is not if the government may implement prior
restraints or subsequent punishments-then the question is raised as to whether curtailment of
the right provokes constitutional problems. The answer is yes. In fact, both prior restraint and
subsequent punishment run the risk of compromising this right as well as all of the First
Amendment values described above. However, because a challenge to the implementation of
either framework would likely be judged in court by the same level of scrutiny, there appears to
be an equal chance of avoiding the erosion of First Amendment values under both models. In
other words, prior restraint and subsequent punishment may provoke constitutional problems,
but they do not appear to provoke appreciably different constitutional problems.
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necessitates. Before tackling this issue, however, it is helpful to consider
paradigmatic case law.
II. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: PRINCIPAL CASES

The most renowned collision between the government's efforts to
keep classified information confidential and the press's attempts to
reveal it to the public occurred in the summer of 1971 in the Pentagon
Papers case.36 To this day, it ranks as "one of the most fractious
episodes in all Supreme Court history."3 7 The case revolved around
what came to be known as the Pentagon Papers, a secret study
commissioned in 1967 by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
that was officially entitled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Vietnam Task Force." 38 The papers leaked when Daniel
Ellsberg, an employee of the RAND Corporation, secretly made copies
of the study and subsequently supplied them to the New York Times and
the Washington Post.39 When the newspapers began publishing excerpts
of the study, the United States filed suit in federal district court seeking,
for the first time in U.S. history, to enjoin the newspapers and to
literally stop the presses. 4 0 As Owen Fiss put it, the threat posed by the
publication of the Pentagon Papers "was a general threat to authority,
to the very power of the executive to maintain a measure of secrecy in
the name of national defense." 4 '
36. A Westlaw search of all Supreme Court and federal appellate cases containing a
citation to the Pentagon Papers case, the phrase "prior restraint" in the text of the opinion, and
the phase "prior restraint" in either the synopsis or digest fields conducted on August 2, 2012
returned eighty-two cases. Upon reading these cases, it became readily apparent that very few of
them addressed restraints on speech or publication in the context of national security
information. The majority of the cases tackled the conflict between the First Amendment's
freedom of speech and press rights and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a fair
trial (thirteen cases), administrative licensing schemes seeking to regulate speech or bar
unprotected classes of speech (thirteen cases), governments' efforts to restrict the speech rights
of demonstrators or protest groups (nine cases), limitations on the right to distribute literature
(eight cases), or governments' ability to restrain the speech of their employees (seven cases).
The remainder of the cases fell within various other categories. Within the predominant
categories of cases, however, most prior restraints adjudicated were struck down by the courts.
It was simply clear to the courts in these cases that the government had failed to meet its burden.
Analysis of this body of case law reveals that the puzzle of prior restraint lies in the truly
difficult cases, which happen to be those that fall within the national security context.
37.

OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 1 (1996).

38. Pentagon Papers, http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers
June 22, 2012).

(last visited

39.

DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED 2, 32, 45 (1996).

40.

Id. at 2-3.

41.

OwEN M. FIss, FREE SPEECH AND THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE: THE PENTAGON

PAPERS CASE 52 (Burke Marshall ed., 1982) [hereinafter Fiss, FREE SPEECH AND THE PRIOR
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After a dizzying series of district and circuit court rulings, the cases
were consolidated for review by the Supreme Court. When the Court
decided the case just four days after oral argument, it produced a highly
unusual result. In its short, three-paragraph per curiam opinion, the
Court stated that the government carried a heavy burden of
demonstrating justification for the imposition of a prior restraint on
publication and that in this case the government had not met its
burden. 42 Following the per curiam opinion, however, were nine
separate opinions, representing a 6-3 vote in favor of denying the
43
government's request for injunctions.
While Pentagon Papers may be a more well-known case, United
States v. Progressive, Inc., a federal district court case, arguably
presents a more compelling factual backdrop. Like Pentagon Papers,
Progressive involved a "clash between allegedly vital security interests
of the United States" and the right of the press to publish freely.44
However, Progressive differs in that the government prevailed. More
specifically, Progressive involved an attempt by the government to
prevent a magazine, The Progressive, from publishing an article entitled
"The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It" that
explained how atomic weapons are assembled.4 5 After agonizing over
the decision before him, Judge Robert Warren granted the government's
*46
Despite
motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin publication.
the fact that the article was not a "do-it yourself' guide for assembling
the bomb, Warren concluded that the article could expedite another
country's efforts to develop such a weapon. 47 Of equal importance,
Warren could find "no plausible reason why the public needs to know
the technical details about hydrogen bomb construction to carry on an
RESTRAINT DOCTRINE].

42. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). Chief Justice Burger later
acknowledged that "every member of the Court [in Pentagon Papers], tacitly or explicitly,
accepted the . . . condemnation of prior restraint as presumptively unconstitutional." Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376, 396 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
43. Harry Kalven, Jr. observed that among the nine different opinions, "there was little
agreement as to what the issues were or as to the appropriate framework for analyzing and
handling them. The difficulties arose [in part] because the issues posed were genuinely novel,
and genuinely difficult." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term--Foreword: Even
When a Nation is at War, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 27-28 (1971) [hereinafter Kalven, Foreword
(citation omitted).
44. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 997. Warren acknowledged Near and Pentagon Papers, stating "publication of
the technical information on the hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to
publication of troop movements or locations in time of war and falls within the extremely
narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint." Id. at 996.
47. Id. at 993.
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informed debate on this issue." 48 Therefore, "[w]hile it might be true in
the long-run, as Patrick Henry instructs us, that one would prefer death
to life without liberty, nonetheless, in the short-run, one cannot en oy
freedom of.. . the press unless one first enjoys the freedom to live.'
III. THE POTENTIAL MEANS TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM

Typically, three primary regulatory approaches have been proffered
as a means of resolving the tension between government secrecy and
press freedom: (1) the absolutist position; (2) the prior restraint model;
and (3) the subsequent punishment framework. In order to fully
appreciate the policy implications of the latter two approaches, an
understanding of the nuances contained in all three is necessary.
A. The Absolutist Position
Based on a literal reading of the First Amendment's command that
"Congress shall make no law. . . ,'s the absolutist position permits no
limitations on the right of the press to publish classified information,
regardless of the government's alleged interest in preventing such
disclosures. 5 ' The most well-known First Amendment absolutist, Justice
Hugo Black, stated his stance succinctly: "It says 'no law,' and that is
what I believe it means." 52 Justice Black maintained that "there are
'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose
by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be
'absolutes."' 5 3 According to the absolutists, expression, in the form of
48. Id. at 994.
49. Id. at 995. As expected, The Progressive appealed the decision. Before the case could
be heard, however, the contents of the article leaked, and the government decided to cut its
losses by withdrawing. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
Nevertheless, Progressive remains a vital piece in the puzzle posed by the tension between
governmental secrecy and an unencumbered press. The lessons and unresolved aspects of the
case, along with those of Pentagon Papers, remain pertinent to the issues articulated in the
remainder of this Article.
50. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
51. Although the absolutist position has virtually no adherents today, especially among
federal judges, it is briefly discussed here not only in the interest of thoroughness but also
because it is a plausible (though ultimately unattractive) solution to the problem presented in
this Article.
52.

JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: "ONOLAW' MEANS No LAW" 45

(Everette E. Dennis et al. eds. 1978) (quoting Justice Black).
53. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63 (quoting Justice Black's remarks made the previous year at New
York University). Charles Black, however, took a contrary view in the same article. Id. at 68
("There are no absolutes, not even in the construction of the word 'absolute' when it is used by a
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speech or publication, should never be repressed or punished. For an
absolutist, in other words, there can be no discounting of the right to
publish information regardless of its potential dangerousness.5 4
Consequently, the press may publish whatever it sees fit.
This position is not entirely without its academic proponents. For
example, the noted scholar Alexander Meiklejohn was well-known for
his own unique form of First Amendment absolutism. Meiklejohn
believed that the First Amendment forbids the abridgement of the right
to speak or publish if the particular act of speech or publication
contributed to the governing of the nation. 5 According to Meiklejohn,
the First Amendment deserved this status because the United States is
governed "by the people," and the First Amendment guarantees them
certain enumerated rights. 6
More recently, Professor Jeffrey Smith has stated that historical
evidence suggests "the Framers intended the press clause to be an
absolute prohibition of government action against the press." 57 In
support of his contention, Smith cites Enlightenment ideals that the Bill
of Rights eventually codified, as well as early assertions of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson.5 8 Smith looks to the language of the
revolutionary-era state constitutionS59 and to the motions in the
Constitutional Convention proposing the adoption of a bill of rights,
concluding that these documents support the notion that the press
should be given an inviolable right to publish.60
Regardless of the evidence that Smith marshals in support of his
contention that the press should enjoy absolute freedom from
government-imposed regulation, the Supreme Court has unequivocally
rejected this view. The Court has recognized numerous classes of
speech that the Constitution does not protect absolutely. 6 1 Further, the
sensible man."). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (describing the
absolutist conception as a "sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an
unresolved conflict") (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
54.

See, e.g., JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 52, at 50

(quoting Justice Black as saying he did not "subscribe to the idea involved in the clear and
present danger rule").
55. Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245,
254-56 (1961).
56. Id.
57. Jeffrey A. Smith, PriorRestraint: OriginalIntentions and Modern Interpretations,28
WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 457 (1987).

58. Id. at 450.
59. Id. at 454 ("Nine of the eleven revolutionary-era state constitutions declared that the
press ought to be 'inviolably preserved' or not 'restrained."') (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 454-55 ("[T]he liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed.") (citation
omitted).
61. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that in a
public forum, "the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
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Court has found that these exceptions to the rule of absolutely protected
speech are especially applicable within the national security context.
The absolutist response would hold that, in practice, a scenario in which
the press came upon information so sensitive that it could actually result
in the loss of life if published is unrealistic; either the government
would sufficiently guard it, or the press would be responsible enough
not to publish it. Both points, however, are vulnerable to stronger
counterarguments.
First, although government failures to protect highly sensitive
information may be uncommon, egregious breaches have occurred. For
example, in 1999 President Clinton left a NATO summit meeting
without the "nuclear football," the briefcase that contains the nuclear
launch codes and a telephone link to the Pentagon.62 Remarkably
several of President Clinton's predecessors experienced similar gaffes.6
In this vein, while attention with respect to WikiLeaks presently focuses
on the recent conviction of Bradley Manning, the alleged leaker of "the
largest cache of classified information in American history," 64 some,
like the editorial board of the Washington Post, have questioned "how a
22-year-old Army private at a remote Iraqi base could have gotten
access to 250,000 State Department cables, as well as tens of thousands
more military reports from Iraq and Afghanistan, and how he could
have downloaded them onto CDs without being detected."65 In response
to these anecdotal accounts, the absolutist contention would be that a
"government that fails to keep its secrets should not force the press to
do so, either by prior restraint or subsequent unishment" because "no
democratic system can ever be entirely safe." 6 This reply, however, is
unsatisfactory and ultimately fallacious in its reasoning: it permits the
of protected speech"); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (finding that
"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (permitting state proscription of speech where the "advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing a rule prohibiting a "public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1953) (holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech");
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that "'fighting' words" may
be constitutionally punished).
62. Americas Clinton Drops Nuclear Football,BBC NEWS.ORG, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/328442.stm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
63. See id. (describing similar incidents during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan
administrations).
64. Steve Fishman, Bradley Manning'sArmy of One, N.Y. MAG., July 3, 2011, available
at http://nymag.com/news/features/bradley-manning-2011-7.
65. Editorial, The Right Response to WikiLeaks, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A20.
66. Smith, supra note 57, at 471.
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press to publish dangerous information merely because the government
happened to lose possession of it and regardless of the fact that the
information might not tend to hold government officials accountable or
inform the public about relevant matters. While it is logical to assume
that the press has a right to retain information it obtains as a result of
governmental negligence, it does not follow that this dangerous
information may necessarily be disclosed, especially under the dubious
rationale that democracies are not perfectly safe. Indeed, if democratic
systems have latent dangers, why implement a framework that
possesses the potential to augment them?
Second, while members of the establishment press, such as
newspapers and network news programs, might be counted on to deal
with such dangerous information responsibly, the world is no longer
dominated by these media outlets. Today, media markets are saturated
with twenty-four-hour cable news networks, a rapidly expanding corps
of bloggers, and even ordinary citizens with an internet connection and
a Twitter account.67 Virtually every American-and much of the
developed world-has the ability to become a journalist in an instant.6
Indeed, the WikiLeaks controversy perfectly illustrates the potential for
the serious danger posed by inviting unedited publication on a mass
scale without any attendant regulation. Although WikiLeaks does
occasionally redact information or withhold documents, one cannot help
but consider the implications if it ceased to do so. After all,
WikiLeaks's self-professed mission is ultimate transparency. In reality,
the lives of American soldiers and Afghan informants, for example,
may have been compromised by WikiLeaks's lack of self-censorship.
Moreover, the WikiLeaks example is particularly disturbing in light of
the fact that, consistent with the organization's procedures and
encryption mechanisms, nobody at WikiLeaks knows who the source of
most of its leaks actually is. 69 Overall, it is clear that the advent of new,
widely available media plays a significant role in the overall calculus
regarding the protection of sensitive information from unnecessary
public disclosure. Today, the notion of a responsible and self-regulating
67. One might question, in light of technological advances, whether Zechariah Chafee's
observation is still correct or applicable to new media: "[T]he owner of a syndicated press chain
is not likely to share the eagerness of Socrates to speak the truth even if he must die. The
balance sheet becomes a more important document than the editorial page, and it seems wiser to
keep them both out of the red." CHAFEE, supra note 21, at 522.
68.

See, e.g., ScoTT GANT, WE'RE ALL JOURNALISTS Now 201 (2007) ("We must adjust

our conception of journalism, and the legal framework built upon it, to reflect that there may be
journalists who make it their profession, but one need not be a professional journalist to practice
journalism.").
69. Jeanne Whalen, WikiLeaks FounderUnaware of Sources, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2010,
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2010/07/27/wikileaks-founder-unaware-of-wholeaked-documents/.

20

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 24

media is at once outdated and dangerously naive.
Although the absolutist position is concededly eloquent in its
simplicity and its ability to be consistently applied, the obvious
counterpoint is as John Hart Ely aptly put it, "[n]o responsible approach
to the problem can be oblivious to the dangers certain types of
expression pose." 70 For this reason, among others, the vast majority of
scholars have correctly found it impossibly difficult to justify an
absolute privilege of publication for the press.7 1 Instead, they have
looked to prior restraint or subsequent punishment as a means of
resolving the tension between government and press.
The various WikiLeaks scandals, however, have cast into doubt the
relevancy of the current debate: the theoretical dispute between these
two frameworks fails to address the underlying concerns over outcome.
As the following sections show, the difference in the frameworks is
largely illusory and the attempt to differentiate between the alternate
models is ultimately misplaced. The clear threats posed by WikiLeaks
and other information leaks show that the debate should focus not on
the mode of suppression, but rather on the degree-and more
specifically-the extent to which security can legitimately be prioritized
over absolute freedom of speech. Before making this argument,
however, it is necessary to briefly explicate each framework and its
theoretical justifications.
B. PriorRestraint
According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the main purpose of
the freedom of the press is to prevent "previous restraints upon
publications." 72 Holmes grounded his conception of the First
Amendment's speech and press clause in the history of the English
experience and the writings of William Blackstone, who explained that
under the English doctrine, "the liberty of the press consists only in this,
that there shall be no previous restraint laid upon the publication .... ,,73
Blackstone's statement is indicative of the 18th-century reaction in
England to a history of censorship, dating from the invention of the

70. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 110
(1980). In support of this position, Ely offered the example that "one simply cannot be granted a
constitutional right to stand on the steps of an inadequately guarded jail and urge a mob to lynch
the prisoner within." Id. at 109. Notwithstanding the fact that this speech might today be
proscribed as incitement, Ely's underlying point is well-taken.
71. See, e.g., Patrick McBride, Mr. Justice Black and His QualifiedAbsolutes, 2 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 37, 69-70 (1969).
72. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Eventually, though, Justice Holmes
"was weaned from Blackstone." Smith, supra note 57, at 461.
73. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243.
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printing press in the 15th century.74 In 1643, Parliament issued an
Ordinance for the Regulation of Printing requiring all would-be
publishers to register for a license to print. Shortly thereafter,
Parliament passed the Printing Act of 1662, which added even more
stringent limitations on publication rights. 76 Under the Act, one simply
could not publish without the prior approval of the state or church. 7 7 In
the ensuing decades, however, England's populace chaffed under the
Act to such a degree that when it came up for renewal in the late 1690s,
Parliament purposefully let it expire. 78
There is no doubt that one of the goals of passing the First
Amendment was to prohibit any such system of executive-administered
prior restraint by license. 79 In fact, there were some who believed this
was the singular purpose of the First Amendment. As late as 1799,
James Madison suggested his concurrence with this viewpoint:
[T]he liberty of the press consists not in a license for every man
to publish what he pleases without being liable to punishment ...
but in a permission to publish, without previous restraint,
whatever he may think proper, being answerable to the public
and individuals, for any abuse of this permission to their
prejudice. 81
The next year, however, in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
Madison explained why this interpretation was incomplete:
74.
75.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 33, at 504.
ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 184-86 (C.H. Firth &

R.S. Rait eds., 1911), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55829.
The order sought to suppress the "great late abuses and frequent disorders in Printing many
false, forged, scandalous, seditious, libelous, and unlicensed Papers, Pamphlets, and Books to
the great defamation of Religion and Government." Id. It was in response to this order that John
Milton penned Areopagitica,his objection to governmental prior restraint through censorship.
On the whole, Milton condemned the use of previous restraints, writing "the fire and the
executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectual remedy that man's prevention can use"
as compared with previous restraints. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 64 (AMS Press 1971)

(1644).
76. See FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776:
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS 239-44 (1952).

77.
78.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 33, at 504.
SIEBERT, supra note 76, at 260-63. According to Siebert, Parliament's dissatisfaction

with the Printing Act grew out of practical considerations, not a "universal principle of freedom
of the press." Id. at 261. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the drafters of the First Amendment
were familiar with this English licensing scheme and made a conscious decision to codify an
ideal contrary to it.
79.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 33, at 504.

80.

Id.

81.

5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2988 (1799).
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The freedom of the press, under the common law, is . . . made to

consist in an exemption from all previous restraint on printed
publications, by persons authorized to inspect or prohibit
them ....

[T]his idea of the freedom of the press can never be

admitted to be the American idea of it; since a law inflicting
penalties on printed publications would have a similar effect with
a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem a
mockery to say that no laws should be passed preventing
publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for
punishing them in case they should be made. 82
Ultimately, Madison was vindicated; this notion-that the First
Amendment exists solely to prohibit prior restraints-has long been
obsolete.8 3 In 1931, the Supreme Court held in Near v. Minnesota that
"the liberty of the press . . . has meant, principally althou h not

exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship." 8 With
regard to prior restraints, however, the Court did not specify precisely
what sort of restrictions would qualify. While it was clear that a blanket
prohibition on publication without administrative approval would be
invalid, the issue being litigated in Near was the legality of a judicially
imposed injunction against further publication of "a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
publication."85

The Court found the particular Minnesota statute

unconstitutional, but explicitly noted that valid exceptions to the rule
against prior restraints exist in the contexts of hindering war efforts,
obscenity, and incitement. 86 In the aftermath of Near, it became clear
that the term "prior restraint" was as yet insufficiently defined.8 7 After
82. JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 569 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
83. See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 21, at 9 ("This Blackstonian theory dies hard, but it
ought to be knocked on its head once for all."). The Blackstonian conception wilted in part
because of its unavoidable implication: If the liberty of the press exists solely in a prohibition
against prior restraints, it suggests a limitless power to punish subsequent to publication. In fact,
the Alien and Sedition Acts prove this point. The Acts' "provision for fines and imprisonment of
persons who had already published 'false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the
Government' of the United States was claimed to be consistent with the first amendment."
William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech,
Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the PriorRestraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
245, 246 (1982). Nevertheless, there remains a "vigorous tradition that speech should be more
protected against prior restraint than against subsequent punishment." Jeffries, supra note 7, at
414. See also infra Part IV.
84. 283 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 702.
86. Id. at 716.
87. Jeffries notes that over the years, "exploitation of the latent plasticities of 'prior
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all, a judicially crafted injunction, enforced by the threat of a contempt
proceeding, is patently different than a licensing scheme administered
before publication.
Addressing this question, Professor John Jeffries summarizes the
various lines of cases decided by the Supreme Court with regard to prior
restraint.89 The Court has established a clear presumption against the
validity of prior restraints that either (1) embody an official licensing
scheme, or (2) impose injunctions against speech or publication.
Jeffries concludes, however, that this doctrine is "entirely
unintelligible. . . . [It] purports to deal with matters of form rather than
substance, but there is no unity among the forms of government action
condemned as prior restraints." 9 1 Notwithstanding the concededly
ambiguous state in which the Supreme Court has left the prior restraint
doctrine, Thomas Emerson provided a broad, workable typology to
which the concept of prior restraint can be anchored for the purposes of
this Article. He devised four categories of restrictions which comprise
prior restraints: (1) a governmental limitation that prohibits future
publication without advance approval from an executive official; (2) a
judicially ordered injunction, enforced by the threat of a contempt
proceeding for violations of the order; (3) a legislative restraint whereby
future publication is made unlawful unless compliance with the
demands of the legislative act are demonstrated; and (4) a restriction
that contains elements of the aforementioned prior restraint categories
but the primary purpose of which is not to serve as a constraint on the
right of the press to publish. 92 Simplified, the definition of a prior
restraint is simply a governmental (executive, judicial, or legislative)
restriction imposed upon speech in advance of publication. 93
As should be apparent, by imposing a presumption of
unconstitutionality, the prior restraint doctrine "assumes that prior
restraint' became a familiar tactical short-cut to expanded substantive coverage of the First
Amendment." Jeffries, supra note 7, at 413-14. According to Justice Scalia, "an injunction
against speech is the very prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, the prior
restraint." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
88. Discussing the differences between the Minnesota statute in Near and the English
system of administrative censorship, Jeffries states: "[In Near,] the decision to suppress was
made by a judge (not a bureaucrat), after adversarial (not ex parte) proceedings, to determine the
legal character of what had been (and not what might be) published." Jeffries, supra note 7, at
416.
89. Id. at 417-19.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 419.
92. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine ofPriorRestraint, 20 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 648,
655-56 (1955) [hereinafter Emerson, The DoctrineofPriorRestraint].
93.

See EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 33, at 504.
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restraints are more harmful to free speech interests than are other forms
of regulation such as criminal prosecutions or the imposition of civil
liability." 94 Before delving into the complexities of this erroneous
assumption, it is necessary to outline the role that subsequent
punishment plays in the resolution of First Amendment questions.
C. Subsequent Punishment
The most common avenue by which the state checks unprotected
speech or publication is prosecution for the violation of a statute. 95 The
Supreme Court elucidated some of the reasons why subsequent
punishment has been historically favored:
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the
degree of protection broader-than that against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction
is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse Aghts of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the
line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely
96
drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.
Obviously, the most glaring difference between subsequent
punishment and prior restraint is that under the latter, the government
attempts to stop publication before it occurs, whereas under the former,
the government's role is invoked only to punish abuses in publication,
rather than prematurely stifling potentially disruptive work.9
Subsequent punishment schemes exist for a multitude of unprotected
categories of speech (for example, obscenity, incitement, and fraudulent
commercial speech, to name just a few). For the purposes of this
Article, however, subsequent punishments will be confined to the
national security context, where "the line between dissent and disloyalty
is elusive." 98 Within this context, American history has been marked by
94. Redish, supra note 7, at 53.
95. These statutes are not considered classic prior restraints because despite the fact that
they may be "on the books" at the time of publication, they are not invoked by a prosecutor until
after the fact of publication. The subtlety of this distinction will be explored later in this Article.
96. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975). For further discussion
of this reasoning, see infra Part IV.
97. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 7, at 427-28.
98. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 940 (2009)
[hereinafter Stone, Free Speech and National Security]. Similarly, Floyd Abrams has stated that
"[h]ard times for the [F]irst [A]mendment tend to come at very hard times for the country ....
When we feel threatened, when we feel at peril, the First Amendment or First Amendment
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several prominent blemishes, 9 9 the experience of which informs presentday conceptions of subsequent punishment. 00
Within the last century, the most egregious attempt by the
government to suppress First Amendment rights during wartime via the
imposition of subsequent punishments is undoubtedly embodied in the
immediate enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917.101 Although
Congress intended the Act to serve simply as a means of protecting
military efforts during World War I, "aggressive federal prosecutors and
compliant federal judges soon transformed the Act into a full-scale
prohibition of seditious utterance.,,102 In a series of noteworthy cases,
the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld convictions under the Espionage
Act.' 0
In Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
acknowledged that "[ilt may well be that the prohibition of laws
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous
restraints."l 04 In doing so, Justice Holmes marked the beginning of the
Court's departure from its earlier position that the First Amendment was
values are sometimes subordinated to other interests." Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, A Nation
Challenged: Speech andExpression; In PatrioticTime, Dissent is Muted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2001, at Al (quoting Abrams).
99. See, e.g., Stone, War Fever, supra note 32, at 1131 ("[T]he United States has a long
and unfortunate history of overreacting to the dangers of wartime. Again and again, Americans
have allowed fear to get the better of them.").
100. For example, in the late eighteenth century, the United States faced intense pressure
to enter the ongoing fray between Britain and France. Following the infamous XYZ Affair,
President John Adams and the Federalist-controlled Congress began to place America on a war
footing. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 23 (2004). In

response to caustic condemnation of these actions in the Republican press, the Federalists
passed the Sedition Act of 1798 as a means of tamping down what they viewed as dangerous
and irresponsible criticism. Id. at 34-36. The Act proved to be a "brutal weapon" with which the
Federalist government abused Republican newspapers and critics of President Adams. Stone,
Free Speech and NationalSecurity, supra note 98, at 941. The constitutionality of the Sedition
Act was never adjudicated, for it expired at the close of Adams's presidency, but in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court affirmed that "the attack on its validity has carried the
day in the court of history." 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
101. The Act provided:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success
of the military . . . or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
102. Stone, Free Speech andNational Security, supra note 98, at 944.
103. See, e.g., Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
104. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
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meant only to guard against prior restraints. Additionally, in Schenck,
the Court determined that speech and publication are subject to varying
degrees of protection based on the situation in which they take place.
Therefore, the Court concluded, the question that must be asked in
every case regarding the subsequent punishment of speech is "whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."' 06 The Court
added that when the nation is at war, "many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight . . . ."to0
Unlike other Western democracies, the United States has no allencompassing "Official Secrets Act."' 8 In part for that reason, and to
the surprise of some, the Espionage Act remains largely in effect.109 In
105. Id. at 52 ("[Tlhe character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done.").
106. Id. This passage embodies what became known simply as the "clear and present
danger" test, some variation of which controlled until it was modified for good in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-54 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. See Jeffries, supra note 7, at 434. While such an act would invariably aid the
government in its quest to keep certain information secret, there would also be "an inherent
proclivity toward pervasive and uncontrollable overbreadth in the classification of official
secrets." Id. at 435. One might question whether such a state of overclassification has effectively
been inaugurated anyway by the explosion in the number of documents that are classified each
year since Jeffries wrote his article. For further discussion of this point, see infra Parts IV.B-C.
109. Presently, the bulk of the Espionage Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-99. Taken
together, § 793(c) and § 793(e) would seem to supply the federal government with the ability to
punish a media outlet that publishes information akin to that in the Pentagon Papers. Stephen
Vladeck is skeptical, arguing that § 793 would not apply to the press because it contains no
explicit reference to "publication" of sensitive national security information. Stephen I. Vladeck,
Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the
Press, I HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 224 (2007). However, in his Pentagon Papers opinion,
Justice White suggested that the government made a mistake by not seeking an indictment
against the newspapers under § 793. 403 U.S. 713, 733-34. More recently, Judge T.S. Ellis
broadly declared in a case against lobbyists, not journalists, that "the government can punish
those outside of the government for the unauthorized receipt and deliberate transmission of
information relating to the national defense." United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 637
(E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Although debate typically centers on the
relevancy of § 793, there is no dispute that other sections of the Espionage Act do expressly
apply to the press. These sections are narrower in scope than § 793, but are clearly aimed in
large part at punishing the publication of sensitive, defense-related information. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 794(b); 18 U.S.C. § 797; 18 U.S.C. § 798(a). Some carry particularly harsh maximum
penalties, such as the death penalty or life imprisonment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 794(b). The
Supreme Court has explicitly declined to grant reporters an absolute privilege to protect their
sources or obtained information. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972)
(holding that reporters are not constitutionally immune from responding to grand jury
subpoenas). However, if the press "lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
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fact, while other statutes have been discussed, the U.S. Department of
Justice has been looking to the Espionage Act as potentially the most
viable mechanism for prosecuting WikiLeaks, going so far as to
convene a grand jury to investigate the outfit for potential violations of
the Act."10 Adding to the federal government's uncertainty as to how
best to proceed is the fact that the Justice Department has never before
successfully convicted a recipient of leaked documents who then went
on to disseminate the confidential information."' Indeed, should a
prosecution be carried out, the government will face difficulty proving
that WikiLeaks actively collaborated with those from whom it received
leaks given that the organization purportedly functions by publishing
submissions it passively receives and given that the organization has not
generally been portrayed as actively soliciting submissions from
whistleblowers.
IV. BENEATH THE REGULATORY SEMANTICS: UNDERSTANDING THE
FALSE DICHOTOMY

Though there exists an increasingly small minority of scholars and
jurists who embrace the absolutist position, the vast majority agree that
the government must be able to prevent the publication of certain
sensitive information. They conclude that one regime-either prior
restraint or subsequent punishment-is superior to the others. However,
this tendency to exalt one approach over the other is misguided; it
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Bartnicki v.
Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 527-28 (2001). As Vladeck perceptively notes, Bartnicki only upheld
this reporting privilege in those instances where it is not also a crime to possess the information.
Vladeck, supra note 109, at 234. Thus, "even if reporters played no role in the dissemination of
classified national security information, and even if the subject matter of the information were a
matter of public concern, the Espionage Act itself makes the reporters' access to the secret
information a crime." Id.
110. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 64. Former U.S. Sen. Joseph Lieberman expressed his
opinion that WikiLeaks violated the Espionage Act, and, significantly, he has also questioned
whether news organizations like the New York Times are culpable for receiving and
disseminating documents originally obtained and disclosed by WikiLeaks. See Charlie Savage,
U.S. ProsecutorsStudy WikiLeaks Prosecution,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, at Al0.
11. For this reason, the government's investigation focused on the source of many of
WikiLeaks's most sensitive documents, former Army private Bradley Manning, who was
arrested in 2010. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Chargesfor Soldier Accused ofLeak, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2010, at A4.
112. That being said, President Obama's administration has exhibited a certain zeal for
prosecuting leakers of classified information that could bear on its willingness to invoke the
Espionage Act to pursue recipients as well. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Inquiry Into Security Leaks is
Casting Chill Over Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at Al.
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presents what in reality amounts to a false choice, for the two
frameworks are highly similar in application and effect.
The following subparts develop this argument by examining the
various categories of similarities while rebutting the arguments that
have been made in support of the misleading notion that prior restraint
and subsequent punishment are fundamentally disparate regulatory
tools.
A. Temporal Application
The most obvious technical difference between the application of a
prior restraint-either a licensing requirement or an injunction-and a
subsequent punishment lies in the fact that the former necessarily occurs
before publication while the latter takes place after the fact. This
temporal distinction has been at the root of several rationales set forth in
favor of the presumption against prior restraints. For example, Vincent
Blasi discusses the fact that once publication takes place and the ideas
or information contained within it becomes available for consumption,
that communication has effectively become a fait accompli; "[t]he
world is a slightly different place."ll 3 In other words, when a prior
restraint is allowed to take place, publication of that idea or information
might be prevented, leading to an erosion of First Amendment values.
Moreover, a judge might be particularly likely to find against the
publisher in the context of sensitive governmental information under the
prior restraint framework because if the judge permits publication, he or
she may bear the responsibility for any adverse repercussions that
result." 4 One might respond that if the communication is so important
and must be revealed, the publisher could either seek judicial review of
the denial of a license or imposition of an injunction, or could simply
choose to publish and bear whatever consequences the court may
impose. Those who support the presumption against prior restraints,
however, would rejoin by pointing out that the delay and difficulty
associated with the former option and the inability of some publishers to
withstand sanctions under the latter option make the prior restraint
approach generally impracticable.
The foregoing reasoning is undeniably persuasive, but closer
inspection reveals two significant flaws. First, it presumes that
subsequent punishment is preferable to prior restraint because it at least
offers a chance for the information to be published before any
sanctioning takes place. Thus, the argument goes, subsequent
punishment better protects First Amendment values. However, this
113. Id. at 51.
114. Id. See Part IV.C. for discussion of this notion.
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presumption ignores the fact that the threat of subsequent punishment,
with its typically more severe sanctions,1 15 may succeed in deterring
publication altogether in some instances." 6 In that event, it is
subsequent punishment that, because of its temporal quality, arguably
deters more speech. Further, the inability to ascertain the precise scope
and extent of the subsequent punishment may constitute a factor that
deters potential speakers, some of whom may have been content to risk
certain known repercussions, but unwilling to subject themselves to an
unknown quantum or degree of punishment. In his analysis, Jeffries
identifies this inherent ambivalence between differing modes of
suppression, observing that there is "no necessary or dependable
relation between the form of suppression and any identifiable measure
of violence to First Amendment interests." 1 7
Second, if the judiciary is functioning properly, one can presume that
information kept from being published under a prior restraint
framework would be found similarly unworthy of protection under the
subsequent punishment model. Thus, as Professor Martin Redish puts it,
"one may question whether any harm of constitutional magnitude
occurs in preventing such speech from reaching the marketplace."" 8 In
response, Blasi might argue that under the subsequent punishment
framework, the availability of the published information prior to
adjudication could change the calculus and lead a judge to permit the
publication of information that would have otherwise been suppressed
under a prior restraint regime. 119 Put differently, persuasive publishers
have a better chance of prevailing in their efforts to avoid sanction
under a subsequent punishment model because they can point to the
publication and argue that it has not produced adverse consequences
and, perhaps additionally, that it has been positively received by its
audience.' However, as Redish incisively notes, in order for Blasi to
be correct, "public reaction to the challenged expression must be
favorable, the judiciary must somehow be made aware of this reaction,
and the judiciary must be sufficiently influenced by this reaction to
reverse its decision on constitutionality."l21 Thus, several stars must
115. See supraParts Il.B-C and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 7, at 430 ("[W]hile those publications that become
subjects of criminal prosecution do become part of the marketplace of ideas, those that are
deterred by the threat of penal sanctions never do."). Put differently, the threat of subsequent
punishment might, from a practical standpoint, cause as much or more delay in speech or
publication as a prior restraint.
117. Id.
118. Redish, supra note 7, at 59-60.
119. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory ofPriorRestraint: The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L.
REv. 11, 42, 51-53 (1981) [hereinafter Blasi, Toward a Theory].
120. Id. at 53.
121. Redish, supra note 7, at 60.
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align for Blasi's assumption to hold true. Overall, the effects of such an
alignment would arguably remain too attenuated to impact judicial
determinations.
A similar, but distinguishable critique of prior restraint is that it
negatively impacts an audience's reception of a publication. Because
prior restraint necessarily involves some sort of license imposition or
adjudication before publication, by the time dissemination is permitted,
audience interest may have declined, or even if it has not, audience
receptivity may be dampened by the awareness that the publication has
been filtered through some sort of approval process.122 However, both
points are disputable. First, an audience might theoretically be more
interested in a publication it already knows has been deemed
constitutional because, as Redish asserts, the publisher will have
garnered a degree of legitimacy.12 3 Second, one cannot equate a judge's
decision not to impose an injunction on a publication as equivalent to
the government placing its imprimatur on it; "rather, it would mean only
that nothing contained in the expression falls within any of the narrowly
drawn categories of expression that are unprotected by the first
amendment."l24 The ultimate danger, Redish concludes, is that because
the threat of subsequent punishment holds equivalent potential to chill
speech, it could lead to a decline in overall publication and a resultant
decrease in the amount of information available to the public.12 5
Therefore, as far as the temporal application of prior restraint and
subsequent punishment are concerned in relation to the impact on
audience reception, neither one possesses an obvious advantage over the
other.
With regard to temporal distinctions, some scholars contend that
subsequent adjudication is preferable to prior regulation because the
former does not take place in the abstract.' 26 In other words, when
publication is being prosecuted under a criminal statute after the fact,
effects have presumably materialized, whereas no external harm has
actually been produced by the prospective publication at issue in a prior
restraint.127 According to Blasi, the effect is that under a prior restraint
regime, the substance of judicial determinations made in the abstract
can be negatively influenced by speculation, generalization, and

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
precedes
or public
127.

Blasi, Toward a Theory, supra note 119, at 64.
Redish, supra note 7, at 71.
Id. at 70.
See id. at 71; see also infra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., Blasi, Toward a Theory, supra note 119, at 49 ("When adjudication
initial dissemination, the communication cannot be judged by its actual consequences
reception.").
Id.
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groundless fear.' 28 Of course, within the national security context,
susceptibility to these factors is especially important. Disputing this
particular point, however, Redish argues that "[bjecause expression may
be regulated only in the presence of a truly compelling governmental
interest, courts will be slow to any restriction on expression when the
demonstration of harm flowing from the expression is purely
speculative."' 29 On a general level, Redish is correct. Indeed, by
declining to enjoin the newspapers despite the government's fear
mongering, the majority of the Court in PentagonPapers seems to have
proved this point. But Pentagon Papers is only one case, and as this
Article suggests, if there is any context in which the judiciary might feel
compelled to stretch the limits on speculative rulings, it would seem to
be that of national security.
Despite the contention that prior restraint doctrine promotes
speculative rulings, Blasi's assertion that the abstract quality of prior
restraint adjudications makes them unfavorable as compared to
subsequent adjudications is ultimately ambiguous. Indeed, there are two
arguments that cut the other way. First, as Redish observes, the abstract
quality of prior restraint adjudications could actually work in favor of
the publisher, for the government will have the ultimate burden of
demonstrating to the judge that there is a danger sufficient enough to
warrant suppression of the publication.130 Second, it is not clear that
only prior restraints are subject to abstract adjudication.131 If, for
example, Fox News broadcast the present location of Ayman alZawahiri or the New York Times published an encryption key for
American military codes, the obvious harms that could flow from such
publication need not actually occur for the news outlets to be
prosecuted. In these examples, subsequent adjudication would
necessarily occur, at least to an extent, in the abstract. Indeed, Redish
makes this point when he discusses what would have ensued had
Pentagon Papers and Progressivebeen subsequent adjudications rather
than efforts by the government to obtain prior restraints.' 32 "Because the
courts would presumably apply some form of clear-and-present danger
analysis to determine whether the speech in both cases was
constitutionally protected," Redish concludes, "they would not likely
demand such a concrete showing." 33
Ultimately, as Redish correctly points out, "abstractness cannot
128.
129.
130.
but later
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 49-50. See also infra Parts IV.B-C.
Redish, supranote 7, at 67.
Id. ("A court could conceivably deny a prior restraint because harm is too speculative,
allow a subsequent punishment because harm actually resulted from the speech.").
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
Id.
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justify a bright-line dichotomy between judicial prior restraints and
subsequent punishments." 34 The practically indistinguishable effects
that the two frameworks produce with respect to First Amendment
values similarly foreclose the establishment of such a split. Therefore,
the temporal application of these two methods of adjudication does not
provide an adequate basis for an argument that one is inherently
superior to the other.
B. Chilling Effects
Doubtlessly, one of the most salient concerns with regard to any
limitation imposed upon First Amendment speech and press rights is the
potential chilling effect that such a restraint might engender. Generally,
the notion is that when speech is curbed or punished, it decreases
incentives for others to speak, thereby depriving the marketplace of
ideas of valuable thoughts and expression. Alexander Bickel, who
argued Pentagon Papers on behalf of the New York Times, espoused the
classic argument disfavoring prior restraints in this regard:
Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all
their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause
irremediable loss-a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of
speech.

. .

. A prior restraint, therefore, stops more speech more

effectively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes.'

35

In arriving at this conclusion, Bickel seems to have embodied the
thinking of the eminent jurist Learned Hand, who similarly maintained
that "in the end it is worse to suppress dissent than to run the risk of
heresy."l 36 In addition to other concerns delineated below, it was this
apprehension about excessive self-censorship that largely contributed to
the Supreme Court's reiteration in Pentagon Papers that prior restraints
are presumptively unconstitutional.137 Indeed, in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,138 the Court cited Bickel in support of its
determination that a prior restraint on speech or publication represents
"the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 69-70.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 4, at 61.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57 (1958). Within the national security context,

of course, the potential harm in permitting speech is not simply "heresy." Rather, it is injury or
death of Americans or aid to a given enemy. Therefore, while it is not suggested that Hand
would budge from his position, it is nonetheless important to note that the outcomes he weighed
are slightly, though not insignificantly, different than those that one factors when conducting a
similar balancing in the national security context.
137. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
138. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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Amendment rights" because a prior restraint constitutes "an immediate
and irreversible sanction."' 3 9
Certainly, it is not difficult to understand why so many prominent
scholars and jurists have reached this conclusion. After all, a prior
restraint such as that sought by the government in Pentagon Papersthat is, an injunction-prevents the information sought to be published
from ever reaching the eyes or ears of the public (assuming, of course,
that the publisher abides by the injunction). Moreover, were such an
injunction upheld, it would create a threat of self-censorship on the part
of the press going forward. That prior restraints may often chill speech
outside the sphere of the actually restricted content is thus indisputable,
but it does not follow that a framework focusing on a subsequent
punishment mitigates any of these negative effects. Indeed, the chilling
effects resulting from the subsequent punishment model are strikingly
similar to those ascribed to the bogeyman of prior restraint.
If media outlets are routinely punished under one of the several
statutes at the government's disposal,14 0 an identical risk of selfcensorship arises. Regardless of the potential value in disclosing the
information to the public, the press will be more disinclined to publish
given the severity of the penalties available under these statutes. In fact,
Professor Stephen Barnett suggested that the chilling effect of
subsequent punishments is actually greater than that produced by prior
restraints: "[t]he pinpointed freeze of a narrowly drawn gag order might
produce less refrigeration overall than the broader chill of threatened
subsequent punishment, especially if the latter carried penalties or
liabilities that were more severe." 41 In this vein, Professor William
Mayton contends that the chill flowing from subsequent punishment is
more pervasive and deleterious than the deterrence generated by a prior
142
restraint.
Ultimately, while prior restraints or subsequent punishments might,
in a given context, chill to different degrees, it is clear that both
frameworks have the ready capacity to do so. 143 Moreover, the adoption
139. Id. at 559.
140. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011; Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421.
141. Stephen R. Bamett, The Puzzle ofPriorRestraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 551 (1977).
142. Mayton, supra note 83, at 276.
143. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Citizens United v. FEC demonstrates how
subtle the distinction can be. In the case, which admittedly falls well outside the context of
national security information, the Court invalidated restrictions on the ability of corporations
and unions to use their funds for expenditures on electioneering communications or on express
advocacy for the election or defeat of a candidate. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 319-21
(2010). In his discussion of the potential chilling effects of these provisions, Justice Kennedy
stated, "[t]his regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of that
term," but the restrictions "function as the equivalent of a prior restraint by giving the FEC
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of either approach will likely deter those seeking to publish sensitive
governmental information because, as Professor Howard Hunter
surmised, "the risk-averse speaker or writer will want to avoid the costs
of an equitable proceeding as much as he will want to avoid any lawsuit
[or prosecution]."'4 In the national security context, where publishers
can expect the government to be especially reactive and hypersensitive
to the disclosure of dangerous information, both approaches necessarily
chill speech (when they are not actually freezing it) because they both
induce fear of government sanction and encourage self-censorship.
C. JudicialReliability Concerns
This discussion is not intended to diminish the difficulty inherent in
balancing security concerns with free speech interests, and it is
inevitable that the entity tasked with such an undertaking must, at times,
seek to create and abide by certain methodologies. However, as this
Article has argued, beyond the semantic and temporal differences
between the two approaches, there is little to distinguish the outcomes
that they produce. The argument that the analytical framework is flawed
demands the attendant inquiry into whether the analysts themselves are
able.145 The task of resolving this delicate balance between
governmental efforts to keep sensitive information secret and the press's
mission to render it available to the public has been left in the hands of
the courts, and it is the judges that comprise those courts who retain
ultimate authority in administering either an injunction or criminal
sanction. Despite the obvious need for a detached and apolitical inquiry
into these issues, there remain significant limitations on the ability of
judges to adequately manage either framework, especially within the
sensitive national security context.
power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England." Id. at 89596. Presumably, Justice Kennedy reached this curious conclusion upon observing that any
corporation or union wishing to avoid criminal liability would likely seek a determination in
advance from the FEC regarding the legality of proposed electioneering activities. Id. at 895.
However, there is no dispute that such an administrative opinion was not required. Id. In fact,
the enforcement scheme constructed by the relevant statutes amounted to a classic subsequent
punishment regime, carrying the threat of civil and criminal penalties for violations. See 2
U.S.C. § 437g(d). Thus, Kennedy's opinion underscores not only the difficulty in teasing out the
distinctions between prior restraint and subsequent punishment frameworks but also the fact that
a subsequent punishment can give a potential publisher or speaker the sort of pause that one
would typically have associated with a prior restraint.
144. Howard 0. Hunter, Toward a Better Understandingof the PriorRestraint Doctrine:
A Reply to ProfessorMayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 286 (1982).
145. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 4, at 278-79 ("[C]an courts meaningfully weigh the
Government's 'need' to conceal, the Press's 'need' to publish, the people's 'need' to know?").
For discussion of how judicial authority can be eroded in "times of stress," see Blasi, The
PathologicalPerspective,supra note 11, at 469-71.
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In support of the contention that courts are capable of navigating this
tightrope, William Mayton asserts that "[t]he judiciary is accustomed to
dealing with a range of societal interests; its basic charge, moreover, is
to vindicate constitutional rights. Courts are therefore more likely to be
primarily sensitive to free speech values and only secondarily protective
of specific government programs."l 4 6 As compared to a bureaucratic
censor who takes both his instructions and pay directly from the
government, Mayton is likely correct.147 Beyond this concession,
however, his evaluation of judicial expertise in this area may be
unfounded. While it is true that judges, especially those "with life tenure
and a more focused attention to the preservation of civil liberties," are
much better equipped to protect First Amendment rights than the
elected branches, they, like most every American, "do not want the
nation to lose a war, and they do not want to be responsible for a mass
tragedy."l 4 8 As a result, judges adjudicating disputes requiring clear
delineation between governmental secrecy and public disclosure may be
predisposed to deferring to the government.149
In fact, Pentagon Papers illustrates precisely this point. The
government ultimately lost the case because it had not persuaded the
Supreme Court that "immediate harm of the gravest sort" would flow
"directly and ineluctably from publication.,,5 Taking stock of the
146. Mayton, supra note 83, at 250-51.
147. But cf Hunter, supra note 144, at 292 (contending that "there is no good reason to
prefer judges as a class over administrative licensors as a class, provided that the charge to the
two classes is similar"). It is clear that on this point, Mayton and Jeffries are correct and Hunter
is wrong. Regardless of how skeptical one might be of the courts' ability to properly weigh the
competing interests at hand in these cases, it is obvious that a judge, charged with impartiality
and bound by an oath to uphold the Constitution, is more likely to protect free speech rights than
a government partisan. Indeed, the Framers crafted the First Amendment in large part to guard
against the installation of the sort of administrative licensing schemes that had typified the
English experience in the century beforehand. See supra Part III.B.
148. Stone, War Fever, supranote 32, at 1147. John Hart Ely similarly remarked:
So long as the constitutional test is geared to the threat posed by the specific
communication in issue, however, courts will tend to be swept along by the
same sorts of fears that moved the legislators and the prosecutorial authorities,
and the First Amendment is likely to end up a very theoretical barrier.
ELY, supra note 70, at 107. It must be briefly mentioned that this Article does not purport to
agree in any way with Alexander Bickel's "essential reality" that "judicial review is a deviant
institution in the American democracy." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

18 (1962). Instead, this section is merely meant to discuss the ability of judges to perfectly
administer a system of either prior restraint or subsequent punishment.
149. Stone, War Fever, supra note 32, at 1147. According to Stone, "there is not a single
instance in which the Supreme Court has overprotected [civil liberties] in a way that caused any
demonstrable harm to national security." Id. at 1148.
150.

BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 4, at 80.
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opinions, however, it is remarkable how many of the Justices the
government was able to convince that the disclosure of the Penta on
Papers would undoubtedly result in substantial harm to the nation.' In
fact, despite the government's assertion that publication of the Pentagon
Papers would "bring about grave national harm," the actual publication
produced no ill effects.' 52 Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
argued Pentagon Papers for the government before the Supreme Court,
and in doing so stated that publication would "irreparably" diminish
America's security.153 In a February 15, 1989 editorial in the
Washington Post, Griswold conceded, however, that he had "never seen
any trace of a threat to the national security from the publication" or
"even seen it even suggested that there was such an actual threat." 54 In
2011, after having kept the study secret for forty years, the National
Archives and Records Administration released the Pentagon Papers in
full without a single redaction. 5 5
How, then, can the Court's fears over publication be squared with
the reality that the publication of the Pentagon Papers had no tangible
effect on national security? Griswold himself provided the answer: "It
quickly becomes apparent to any person who has considerable
experience with classified material that there is massive
overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not
with national security but rather with governmental embarrassment of
one sort or another." These issues of document overclassification and
151. See FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY 49 (2005). It is also worth noting that before

the case reached the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
decided in an en banc, per curiam decision to remand the case to the district court because it
remained unconvinced that publication would not result in "grave and immediate" danger to the
United States. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971).
152. Brief for the United States at 23, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (Nos. 1873 and 1885).
153. ABRAMS, supra note 151, at 52.
154. Erwin N. Griswold, Editorial, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified
Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25. Prior to Griswold's admission, Floyd Abrams
called every government witness he could find who had testified in the case, and not one could
point to any portion of the published Pentagon Papers that compromised national security.
ABRAMS, supra note 151, at 51.

155. See Nixon Presidential Historical Materials: Opening of Materials, 76 Fed. Reg.
27,092 (May 10, 2011).
156. Griswold, supra note 154. The balancing act thus becomes more difficult for courts
when any national security interest asserted by the government has to be discounted in order to
reflect the fact that the government might be overestimating the danger or, even worse, covering
up embarrassing information that has little to no bearing on national security. According to
Benno Schmidt, Jr., the resolution and aftermath of Pentagon Papers"signaled the passing of a
period when newspapers could be expected to play by tacit rules in treating matters that
Government leaders deem confidential." ABRAMS, supra note 151, at 53 (quoting Schmidt).
Although U.S. administrations have long protected secrets in the name of safeguarding the
nation, the classification of documents is a relatively new phenomenon, originating during
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government discomfiture over information disclosure have never been
more significant in light of WikiLeaks. Indeed, some have defended
WikiLeaks on the basis that many of the documents it has disclosed are
innocuous and more often embarrassing than truly damaging. 5 7 Yet,
denunciation of WikiLeaks by government officials has been rampant.
Despite this condemnation of WikiLeaks's disclosures, there has been
no consensus as to whether the government should use prior restraint or
subsequent punishment to check their occurrence. Ultimately, though, it
is clear that among the three branches of government, the judiciary is
the most detached and thus best equipped to grapple with attempts to
regulate speech in the national security context under either
methodology.
D. Susceptibility to Hysteria
First Amendment speech and press rights are most vulnerable under
both the prior restraint and subsequent punishment approaches in times
of discord. When America is perpetually at war with an enemy-as the
nation presently is with terrorists and formerly was with communiststhe government's propensity to guard information is at its zenith. As a
consequence, pressure to grant a prior restraint or countenance a
conviction mounts, fueled often by the permeation of hysteria. In truth,
"cyclical outbreaks of fear-by legislators, by government officials, and
by the larger society-and the felt need to suppress what we fear,
provide a narrative thread through much of free expression in general,
and of freedom of the press in particular."15 8
In a provocative piece, Vincent Blasi dubs these times of First
Amendment crisis as "pathological periods" during which "the times
Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. See Wallace Eberhard, The Threatfrom Within: Balancing
Access and National Security, in ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 195, 201 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L. Splichal eds., 2000). To say the
practice has since caught on would be a dramatic understatement. It has been estimated that over
15 million documents were classified in 2004 alone, more than twice as many as were classified
in 2001. See Jackie Northam, Government Documents Increasingly Classified (NPR radio
broadcast Sept. 8, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld-4837061). In 2009, President Obama created the National Declassification Center in
order to quicken the federal government's pace of document declassification. See Michael D.
Shear, Obama Creates Centerfor Declassification,WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2009, at A2.
157. See, e.g., John B. Judis, A Defense of Wikileaks, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 2010,
available at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/79526/in-defense-wikileaks-iraq-iran-china-fore
ign-policy.
158. Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press after 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561,
1564 (2008). A particularly relevant example from American history can be found in the
McCarthy Hearings conducted in 1954 by the Senate's Subcommittee on Investigations. For an
analysis of the hearings, see RODGER STREITMATTER, MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD: HOW THE
NEWS MEDIA HAVE SHAPED AMERICAN HISTORY 156-62 (1997).
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seem so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or without
seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by many
persons as anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically
formalistic." 5 9 Without a doubt, America remains in the grip of just
such a period in this, the post-9/11 era.
Regardless of whether prior restraint or subsequent punishment is
employed during the "pathological periods" to protect governmental
secrecy, Judge Richard Posner instructs that the "prioritizing of either
security or liberty is unpragmatic." 6 0 Rebuking civil libertarians,
Posner, in typical fashion, advocates "balancing":
The safer the nation feels, the more weight judges should give to
liberty. The greater the threat that some activity poses to the
nation's safety, the stronger will seem-and will be-the grounds
for seeking to repress that activity at some costs to liberty, and so
the balance will tilt the other way.16 '
In the abstract, Posner's brand of cost-benefit analysis is plausible
enough, as is his contention that legislative and judicial officials should
not have a thumb on the scale, one way or the other, when weighing
these considerations.162 Moreover, it is certainly true that, as Justice
Robert Jackson put it, the Bill of Rights cannot be allowed to become a
"suicide pact."' As Laurence Tribe has eloquently framed the notion:
"[w]e must not bind ourselves too tightly to a mast suited only for
navigating peaceful seas."l 64
In practice, however, it is unclear whether Posner adequately
addresses the ability of hysteria and fear to distort the calculus. This
power is compounded in present times by the often faceless, amorphous
nature of the terrorist threat America faces. Furthermore, Posner's
conclusion that dangers to national security have been historically
underestimated while threats to First Amendment rights have been
overestimated seems tenuous.165 As Stone aptly notes, even if the
159. Blasi, The Pathological Perspective, supra note 11, at 456-57. See also id. at 512
("The damage to the constitutional system is incalculable when its most basic commitments turn
out to be inoperative in stressful times.").
160.

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 300 (2003).

161. Id. at 296. Not all self-proclaimed liberals are in disagreement with Posner in this
regard. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Liberal Reality Check, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at A23
("[C]ivil libertarians are also dishonest in refusing to acknowledge the trade-off between public
security and individual freedom.").
162. POSNER, supra note 160, at 298.
163. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
164. Laurence H. Tribe, Why Congress Must Curb Bush's Military Courts, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18.
165. POSNER, supra note 160, at 298-99.
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government occasionally underestimates threats to its security, such is
"no reason to shut our eyes to the fact that it also underestimates the
dangers of silencing dissent."' 66
This criticism of Posner's prescription is not meant to suggest the
government has been immune from mistake in calculating risks or that
governmental protection of certain sensitive information must never
trump freedom of the press ideals. Rather, it is aimed at demonstrating
the fact that if a framework other than the absolutist approach is adopted
to protect this governmental interest, it will be subject to the distorting
influence of fear and hysteria.
Some might argue that a prior restraint framework is better equipped
to combat this hysteria. In fact, one could argue that Pentagon Papers
demonstrates precisely this point. In that case, the Supreme Court used
the prior restraint context to arrive at a conclusion evincing a
demonstrable commitment to vital First Amendment interests. Indeed,
the majority of Justices declined to address whether the speech would
have been protected had the papers already been published. In this
sense, it seems as though Pentagon Papers served as a bulwark against
the notion that hysteria is likely to dictate the outcome of a case
addressing the validity of the government's attempt to impose a prior
restraint. Even if this notion is accurate, it may have been the case that
the Court would have reached effectively the same result had it
reviewed the papers subsequent to publication under a strict scrutiny
standard of review. Thus, if the Court is determined to transcend
hysteria and reach a speech-friendly result, it can do so under either
framework. Similarly, if a majority of the Justices falls victim to
hysteria because it believes the nation to be imperiled by a particular
publication, neither model will function to allow free, costless
dissemination of the information. Therefore, it is again apparent that the
line between the methodologies is blurred, and that the ostensible
differences between the two approaches are, in fact, vulnerable to
identical critiques.
E. ProceduralSafeguards
One of the most commonly cited distinctions between the prior
restraint and subsequent punishment enforcement frameworks arises
from a perceived difference in terms of the procedural protections they
afford. Some have argued that prior restraints, through judicial
imposition of injunctions, are superior in this regard. For example,
Mayton argues that the purpose of subsequent punishment is to
166. Stone, War Fever, supra note 32, at 1150. Furthermore, "[tihere is no evidence that
the nation's 'overprotection' of constitutional rights caused any of these [national security]
misjudgments." Id.
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create self-censorship on the part of the many timid or prudent
souls who are averse to the risks of prosecution and punishment.
Unfortunately, self-censorship evades .. . judicial review .... A
system of injunctive relief, on the other hand, is more protective
of first amendment values because it requires such process.1 67
Mayton also contends that a system of injunctive relief actually
protects First Amendment rights to a greater extent than subsequent
punishment because the high transaction costs of procuring an
injunction will often deter the government from attempting to censor the
press. 168 This conclusion is not unreasonable, but one might question
whether there are not equally substantial or greater transaction costs
associated with enforcing statutes that proscribe certain types of
publication. Assuming that the government has a true desire to enforce
the statutes, and given the greater burden of proof in such cases, the
transaction costs associated with producing sufficient witnesses and
evidence would seem to be significant.
While Mayton praises the virtues of injunctive restraint, others have
pointed out a potential hazard associated with such a regime: the
collateral bar rule. An injunction barring the publication of sensitive
information has to be accompanied by an enforcement mechanism
because, in the absence of clear consequences, the press could flout the
court's command with impunity. With respect to injunctive restraints,
the relevant enforcement mechanism is the threat of a contempt action
for violation of the injunctive order. Not only are contempt actions held
without a jury, but a judge who has had his own order disobeyed is not
likely to drop the matter and permit the violation.1 69 More importantly,
however, the collateral bar rule dictates that those charged with criminal
contempt may not assert as a defense that the injunction was
unconstitutional, even in the First Amendment realm.1 70 This rule stands
in opposition to the rule for violations of criminal statutes where the
unconstitutionality of the statute is normally a valid defense.171
According to Barnett, because of the collateral bar rule:

167. Mayton, supra note 83, at 261.
168. Id. at 272.
169. Barnett, supra note 141, at 552.
170. Id. See also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967) (holding
that petitioners were properly charged with criminal contempt for the violation of an injunctive
order despite the clear constitutional issues raised by it).
171. While the collateral bar rule is "thought to foster respect for the law and the legal
system," it ultimately "appears embarrassingly inconsistent with the accepted practice for
statutory violations." Redish, supra note 7, at 94. For a cogent discussion of why abandoning
the collateral bar rule would likely not sufficiently appease those who disfavor prior restraints,
see id at 97 n.155.
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[A] newspaper or broadcast station subject to a gag order is
placed in a trilemma of chilling effects unique to a prior restraint
situation. It can comply with the order and take no legal steps,
thereby accepting the suppression. It can appeal the order
directly, but it must obey the interim restraint while it does so,
which in this case of a daily newspaper will almost certainly
result in the suppression of at least one day's coverage. Or it can
publish in the face of the gag order, but only at the price of
forfeiting its legal and constitutional objections to the order and
thus, in all probability, embracing a contempt conviction.172
Thus, Barnett concluded, an injunction is inferior to a subsequent
punishment, at least so long as the collateral bar rule remains applicable
in the context of the former. 173
Certainly, Barnett and the others who have thoroughly examined the
collateral bar rule make compelling points. What is not clear, however,
is whether the collateral bar rule represents the "unique vice of prior
restraints."' 74 First, as Stone notes, the sanctions imposed on the press
for criminal contempt would likely be significantly less severe than
those imposed for violation of one of the aforementioned criminal
statutes. 1 5 Second, from a notice standpoint, a prior restraint "actually
enables the speaker to know in advance whether his speech is subject to
punishment."' 76 Third, putting aside the aforementioned concerns
regarding judicial reliability, it is important that the collateral bar rule
only comes into play upon violation of a judicially imposed order.
Presumably, under most standards of review, a judge-especially a
federal one with life tenure and salary protection-can be better trusted
than a bureaucratic censor or legislator to make a shrewd decision in
this regard and not be swayed to as great an extent by the government's
fear mongering. Judges are clearly far from infallible, but it is true that,
notwithstanding their potential susceptibility to hysteria, they have no
"vested interest in the suppression of speech." 77
Even if one considers the applicability of the collateral bar rule to be
a noteworthy difference between prior restraint and subsequent
punishment, one must ask: is it sufficiently problematic to say, in turn,
that there is a significant difference between prior restraint and
subsequent punishment? The answer, it seems, is no. The presence of
172.
173.
174.
175.

Barnett, supra note 141, at 553.
Id.
Redish, supra note 7, at 97.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARv. L. &

POL'Y REv. 185, 201 (2007).

176.
177.

Id.
Jeffries, supra note 7, at 427.
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the collateral bar rule in the prior restraint context represents a marginal
difference as compared to subsequent punishment. This is the case
because the standard of review that would be applied in relation to an
injunctive prior restraint would likely be strict scrutiny (or something
close to it), meaning that few injunctions would be imposed and upheld,
and thus that the collateral bar rule would rarely come into play.
Ultimately, it is apparent that with regard to procedural safeguards,
neither approach offers a clearly superior framework. In fact, with
respect to the enforcement phases of the two models, prior restraint and
subsequent punishment are often functionally equivalent.' 7 8 A publisher
charged with criminal contempt receives several of the same critical
procedural protections that would otherwise attach during a prosecution
under a criminal statute after the fact of publication. These protections
include the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the right not to be compelled to testify against

oneself. 179
F. Civil Disobedience
In his analysis of PentagonPapers,legal scholar Harry Kalven made
an interesting observation. He noted that the New York Times and the
Washington Post, in publishing the Pentagon Papers and resisting the
government's efforts to stop the presses, were "engaged in a kind of
political action, akin to civil disobedience.,,' 8 0 In this context, he
concluded "prior and subsequent restraints are not coterminous." 8 1
Kalven speculated that when the Supreme Court declined to impose an
injunction on publication of the papers, it put in place an effective
safeguard for members of the press choosing to engage in civil
disobedience. 182 Therefore, the implication is that in a future case with a
similar posture to that of Pentagon Papers, application of a prior
restraint scheme might fall prey to the government's assertions of grave
national harm and thus fail to adequately protect the press's ability to
178. See id. The enforcement phase of a prior injunctive restraint scheme should not be
confused with the actual proceeding that takes place to determine whether the government's
request for an injunction should be granted. In this phase, the procedural protections are
diminished. See Emerson, The Doctrine ofPriorRestraint,supra note 92, at 657.
179. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
180. Kalven, Foreword,supra note 43, at 34. It should be noted that some, like Vincent
Blasi, dispute this characterization for its impreciseness. Blasi, Toward a Theory, supra note
119, at 42 ("[T]he 'compliance' of the New York Times and The Progressive took the form of
eschewing self-help while pursuing motions to vacate. These publications 'censored' themselves
from being civil disobedients, but not from being first amendment speakers.").
181. Kalven, Foreword,supra note 43, at 34.
182. Kalven also asserted that "[n]o politically tolerable scheme of subsequent restraints
would have prohibited the principled disobedience of the newspapers." Id.
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engage in political insubordination.' 83 A corollary to this notion is the
fact that upon a cursory analysis, subsequent punishment would seem to
accommodate civil disobedience by imposing sanctions only after the
publication in question has taken place. Thus, under the subsequent
punishment framework, Blasi quips, "[p]rotestors are permitted to speak

now and pay later."

84

Considering Kalven's observation, Owen Fiss remains skeptical,
pointing out that, as the Court was well aware, the papers had already
made their way into the public domain.'8 5 Additionally, as Blasi notes,
acts of civil disobedience can have social utility on occasion, but the
cannot enjoy explicit constitutional protection by definition.1 6
Nevertheless, might Kalven's critique of prior restraints exemplify a
major distinction between that approach and subsequent punishments?
Perhaps, but if one accepts the argument-discussed above in Part
IV.B.-that subsequent punishment sometimes produces greater
chilling effects upon prospective publishers, it would seem that it, rather
than prior restraint, would present the more onerous obstacle to
effective civil disobedience. Indeed, it is subsequent punishment, not
criminal contempt under a prior restraint regime, which imposes the
more severe sentence. It is not difficult to imagine a media outlet that
would be willing to withstand the penalties of a criminal contempt
conviction for violating a judicial order but which is unwilling to sustain
a six-figure fine or the lifetime imprisonment of its owners, editors, or
employees.
If one views injunctive prior restraint as the government's "ultimate
plea for cooperation," defiance of such might assume the "dimensions
of a revolutionary act."' 8 7 In this respect, however, arguments can be
made for and against prior restraint as it relates to civil disobedience.
Those who seek to truly shake up social or political order might
welcome the opportunity to disobey a judicial order, especially
considering the fact that publication in contravention of such an order
would garner considerably intensified attention. Conversely, a media
outlet that seeks to simply hold the government accountable and provide
the public with newsworthy information might have "mixed emotions
183. Cf Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19
HOFSTRA L. REv. 67, 69 (1990) (making a similar argument with regard to injunctions against
particular types of protests). See also Blasi, Toward a Theory, supra note 119, at 76 ("No
regulatory system can be expected to legalize civil disobedience. That would amount to a
contradiction in terms. But systems may differ regarding how much of an accommodation they
make to the tactic of civil disobedience.").
184. Blasi, Towarda Theory, supra note 119, at 77.
185.

Fiss, FREE SPEECH AND THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE, supra note 41, at 62.

186.
187.

Blasi, Towarda Theory, supra note 119, at 43.
Id. at 42.
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about nibbling at the foundations ofjudicial authority."' 8 8
Although Kalven's point regarding civil disobedience is an
important one, it ultimately succeeds in focusing attention on the
similarities between prior restraint and subsequent punishment. In the
end, as Blasi suggests, "[s]peakers who are not averse to being punished
should be no more reluctant to violate permit requirements or
injunctions than criminal prohibitions."' 89 Therefore, neither approach,
in fact, presents a clearly greater threat to the ability of the press to
engage in protest.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps strongest in its simplicity is John Jeffries's contention that
the difference between a prior injunctive restraint and a subsequent
punishment is no more than temporal; that despite the conventional
analysis that seeks to differentiate the two methodologies, the sole
distinction between them is whether adjudication precedes or postdates
the speech.1 90 This Article has sought to build on this observation by
demonstrating that this simple distinction constitutes the only difference
between the two frameworks. Even this temporal difference with regard
to the adjudication of illegality, like all of the other alleged differences
between the two approaches discussed above, is not substantial. As
such, this Article has demonstrated that the conclusions drawn by most
legal scholars thus far have been unsatisfying and ultimately unhelpful.
However vehement the opposing sides in the debate may be, the
discussion, historically and at the moment, is off-track; as regulatory
tools implemented to resolve the tension between governmental secrecy
and public disclosure, prior restraint and subsequent punishment do not
produce dichotomous results. Indeed, the differences between the prior
restraint and subsequent punishment frameworks are largely
definitional, and when viewed in their practical application, they create
effectively equivalent outcomes.
This Article began by describing a fundamental quandary: how to
strike the proper balance between secrecy and disclosure in the context
of national security. It is in this context that the countervailing interests
between the government and the press are the most challenging to
resolve, and it is in this context that the most is at stake-in terms of
potential repercussions-for the courts tasked with balancing them. This
Article has demonstrated that the solution to the foregoing problem does
not lie in the selection of one theoretical framework over another.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 77.
Jeffries, supra note 7, at 428.
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Instead, a paradigmatic shift is required whereby the debate realigns to
focus on the creation of desired outcomes rather than the current
theoretical quibbling over approach. As this Article has suggested, the
moment is perfectly primed for just such a shift in parameters, as
WikiLeaks and the Obama administration's leaks regarding cyber
warfare and drone attacks have shown that the relevant question is not
the mode of suppression of speech, but rather, the desired degree. By
prioritizing outcome over approach, policy makers stand a chance of
moving forward and determining to what extent the suppression of
speech can be justified in the interests of national security.
POSTSCRIPT
Several important developments relevant to this Article took place
after its date of publication. They merit brief mention here.
The most recent challenge in the effort to strike the appropriate
balance between security and the free flow of information is
determining the best response to dramatic disclosures by former
contractor Edward Snowden. In June 2013, on the basis of information
leaked to it by Snowden, the Guardian published an expos6 on the
NSA's previously undisclosed daily mining of the telephone records of
millions of Americans.1 91 At the same time, the Washington Post
revealed-to many Americans' dismay-that the NSA and FBI had
been conducting a secret surveillance program known as PRISM
whereby they were granted direct access to servers maintained by some
of the world's most popular internet companies.1 92 Just two weeks after
his disclosures were initially published, federal prosecutors charged
Snowden with violating the Espionage Act. 193 As with WikiLeaks,
reactions have been sharply divergent. He has been hailed as a
courageous whistleblower by some and condemned as a traitor by
others.194 There is no disagreement, however, over the fact that
191. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.ocom/world/2013/jun/06/
nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
192. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-inter
net-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0cOda8-cebf- 11e2-8845-d970ccb04497
story.html.
193. See Scott Shane, Leaker Charged with Violating Espionage Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2013, at Al.
194. See, e.g., Paul Owen & Tom McCarthy, Edward Snowden Hailed As Hero, Accused
of Treason-As it Happened, GuARDIAN, June 10, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.
com/world/blog/2013/jun/I 0/edward-snowden-revealed-as-nsa-whistleblower-reaction-live.
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Snowden's leaks-and the media's subsequent publication of their
contents-have underscored the salience of the debate over when and
by whom highly sensitive information should be disclosed, if ever, in
this WikiLeaks world.
Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
applied Branzburg and held that the First Amendment does not shield
members of the press who receive unauthorized leaks from being
compelled to testify at trial against those accused of leaking the
information.19 5 The case, which to date has not been appealed to either
the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit, involves
an effort by New York Times reporter James Risen to quash a subpoena
and seek a protective order that would prevent the federal government
from forcing him to testify in its case against Jeffrey Sterling, a former
CIA analyst who has been indicted for violating, among other things,
section 793 of the Espionage Act.196 The government contends that
Sterling disclosed to Risen classified information regarding a covert
CIA operation, which Risen subsequently included in a book he
authored in 2006.197 To the extent the court's opinion is upheld, it will
more clearly define the limits of the protection afforded to the press by
the First Amendment.
On July 30, 2013, the military judge presiding over Army private
Bradley Manning's court-martial acquitted him of "aiding the enemy"
under Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but found
him guilty on a multitude of other counts, including six counts of
violating the Espionage Act. 198 To date, Manning has not been
sentenced.
These recent events add color and contour to the tensions described
in this Article, but they do not add clarity. Rather they underscore the
uncertainty that predominates this field. While the scope of the
disclosures focuses attention on the vital security interests at stake, the
extent of the surveillance mechanisms raises legitimate concerns
regarding the array of personal liberties that citizens stand to lose. This
postscript is less of a conclusion than a preface as the paradigms that
underlie the First Amendment's role in the national security context
have been forced into uneasy flux.

195. United States v. Risen, No. 11-5028, 2013 BL 192187, at *25 (4th Cir. July 19,
2013).
196. Id. at *2-3.
197. Id. at *3.
198. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Manning is Acquitted of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2013, at Al.

